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There Are More Things to Punitive Damages in Admiralty Than the
1:1 Ratio Set Forth in Exxon’s Legal Philosophy
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr.*
ABSTRACT
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
the right to recover punitive damages in admiralty cases and held that
punitive damages in the case before it could not exceed the amount of the
compensatory damages awarded plus the amount of settlements in related
cases. In so holding, the Court reviewed many studies related to punitive
damages and said that in a case where the defendant’s conduct was
reckless but not worse, where the damages awarded were substantial, and
where the defendant was not motivated by profit a 1:1 ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages was appropriate. After Exxon, it was unclear if
the decision imposed an across-the-board 1:1 ratio cap on punitive
damages vis-à-vis compensatory damages in admiralty or was limited to
cases “like” Exxon.
This Article argues that the appropriate reading of Exxon is that it
created a variable, multi-factor approach to punitive damages in maritime
cases, rather than a universal 1:1 rule. The variable approach is
supported by a careful reading of Exxon itself, the desirability of flexibility
in imposing punitive damages for purposes of adequate punishment and
efficient deterrence, and the jurisprudence since Exxon.
While a variable approach is more desirable than a 1:1 cap, thorny
issues arise with the application of any ratio in punitive damages cases
involving the arbitrary and capricious failure to pay maintenance and
cure. The injured seaman often joins the failure to pay maintenance and
cure claim with Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims; but punitive
damages are not available in Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims. Thus,
where the claims overlap a court must be careful that the compensatory
damages denominator in the punitive damages ratio fraction only includes
compensatory damages arising out of the failure to pay the maintenance
and cure claim. This piece recommends how courts can assure the needed
precision and accuracy.
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INTRODUCTION
In act I, scene five of the eponymous play, Hamlet tells Horatio,
“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of
in your philosophy.”1 Hamlet is apparently letting his friend know that
there are limits to the philosophy they learned together as students at
Wittenberg. Likewise, there is more to any area of law than the holding in
any particular case, including a U.S. Supreme Court decision, and
subsequent courts must consider the context of the previous ruling, the
facts, any limiting language in the previous opinion, and the underlying
policies or purposes of the relevant body of law. These truths are especially
applicable in admiralty because so much of American maritime law is
judge-made.
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,2 the U.S. Supreme Court
acknowledged3 that a plaintiff in an admiralty case may, where

1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 1, sc. 5, l. 187–88 (“There more
things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”).
2. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
3. The defendant, Exxon, unsuccessfully argued that the Clean Water Act,
or 33 U.S.C. § 1321, preempted the punitive damages claim before the Court. Id.
at 485–90. But technically, Exxon did not “offer a legal ground for concluding
that maritime law should never award punitive damages, or that none should be
awarded in this case.” Id. at 490. But the Court’s entire discussion essentially
presupposes that punitive damages are available in maritime cases, and Atlantic
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appropriate, recover punitive damages. After recognizing the right to
recover punitive damages in admiralty, Justice Souter,4 writing for the
Court, then engaged in an extensive discussion of the appropriate ratio
between punitive damages and compensatory damages in the case before
the Court. He then stated that the governing ratio in a case “like” Exxon
was 1:1 (punitive damages: compensatory damages).
Justice Souter’s discussion of the ratio question was extensive,
running to 26 pages in the official reports. Justice Souter considered the
jurisprudence, but he went beyond it to discuss multiple studies of punitive
damages awards. He wrote about the frequency of awards, the magnitude
of awards, the ratios of punitive to compensatory damages as revealed in
the studies, standard deviations in punitive damages awards, and more. His
opinion built to a crescendo in which he stated that in:
cases like this one . . . given the need to protect against the
possibility (and the disruptive cost to the legal system) of awards
that are unpredictable and unnecessary, either for deterrence or for
measured retribution, we consider that a 1:1 ratio, which is above
the median award [for punitive damages in the studies the Court
consulted], is a fair upper limit in such maritime cases.5
A first read of Justice Souter’s opinion might lead one to conclude
that, given the extensive, in-depth discussion of the matter, the Court was
articulating a rule for all maritime cases. But the Court expressly stated
that the 1:1 ratio was applicable to “cases like this one.” The Court said
that the decision was applicable to “such maritime cases.”6 “Such maritime
cases” are not, literally, all maritime cases. Linguistically, then, “such
maritime cases” are “cases like this one.” But what about maritime cases
that are not like Exxon? Does the 1:1 ratio decision apply to those other
cases? Alternatively, is the 1:1 ratio a universal rule for all admiralty cases
or is it limited to Exxon itself and, perhaps, similar fact situations?
A good place to start the search for a solution to that question is to
decide what “cases [are] like” Exxon, i.e., to define such cases. Happily,
Justice Souter gave us more than a hint of an answer to that question. He
described the Exxon case as follows: “[Here] [w]e confront . . . a case of
reckless action, profitless to the tortfeasor, resulting in substantial
Sounding Co. v. Townsend, discussed herein, confirms that point. 557 U.S. 404
(2009).
4. Justice Souter wrote for the majority. Justice Alito took no part in the
consideration of the case. Exxon, 554 U.S. 471.
5. Id. at 513.
6. Id.
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recovery for substantial injury.”7 Immediately before that statement,
Justice Souter wrote that the case involved conduct that was “worse than
negligent but less than malicious.”8 So perhaps the 1:1 cap would not apply
in a case where the defendant’s behavior was malicious—worse than
reckless—or where the defendant’s activity that gave rise to the punitive
damages claim was profitable or where the plaintiff’s injury was not
substantial, i.e., the compensatory damages were not great.9 Notably,
Exxon was also a case where the damage arising from the defendant’s
conduct was not difficult to discover.
Since Exxon, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the issue of the
recoverability of punitive damages in admiralty in Atlantic Sounding Co.
v. Townsend.10 In Townsend, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas,
held that a seaman could recover punitive damages from an employer who
willfully and arbitrarily failed to pay maintenance and cure. Justice
Thomas reasoned that (1) punitive damages were available at common
law; (2) punitive damages were available in maritime law; (3) there was
nothing to indicate that the general rule allowing recovery of punitive
damages in admiralty did not apply in maintenance and cure cases; and (4)
Congress had not displaced or otherwise abrogated the general rules
regarding the recoverability of punitive damages in maintenance and cure
cases.11 In a footnote, the Court also said, in part: “Nor have petitioners
7. Id. at 510–11. Exxon was a case where a relapsed alcoholic, captaining
an Exxon oil tanker, ran aground in Prince William Sound and caused significant
damages (the jury awarded the relevant plaintiffs $287 million and Exxon also
settled with other plaintiffs for $303 million). In addition, Exxon paid over $3
billion in cleanup, penalties, and fines. Exxon’s recklessness was in allowing the
alcoholic to continue to captain its ships despite having knowledge of his relapse.
The failure to relieve the captain of command was not profit-motivated. The trial
court had awarded $4.5 billion in punitive damages, which the Ninth Circuit
ultimately reduced to $2.5 billion.
8. Id. at 510.
9. One of the justifications for punitive damages (as well as class actions) is
that if the defendant causes a minor injury to many, no single plaintiff would be
economically motivated to file suit, even though the total damages inflicted upon
all plaintiffs might be significant. Thus, allowing recovery of punitive damages
provides an incentive to sue and consequently deter the defendant from continuing
to engage in the wrongful behavior. See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Risks
of and Reactions to Underdeterrence in Torts, 70 MO. L. REV. 691, 704 (2005).
10. 557 U.S. 404 (2009).
11. See FRANK L. MARAIST ET AL., ADMIRALTY IN A NUTSHELL 234–35 (7th
ed. 2017); see also Thomas C. Galligan, Jr. & Brittan J. Bush, Displacement and
Preemption: The OPA’s Effect on General Maritime Law and State Law Punitive
Damages Claims, 42 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (2011). See generally Townsend, 557 U.S. 404.
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argued that the size of punitive damages awards in maintenance and cure
cases necessitates a recovery cap, which the Court has elsewhere imposed.
We do not decide these issues.”12
Now, 12 years have passed since the decision in Exxon and 11 years
have elapsed since the decision in Townsend. It is time for a review of
those cases that have considered and applied the Exxon 1:1 ratio. A review
of those decisions reveals that the courts generally and correctly have not
treated the 1:1 ratio as a universal cap on the maximum amount of punitive
damages recoverable in a maritime tort case. Instead, the courts have
adopted a variable approach based on various factors: conduct, profit
motivation, and size of the compensatory damages award. Judges have
realized that where the defendant engaged in conduct worse than
recklessness or where the defendant’s underlying activity giving rise to the
liability for punitive damages was profit-motivated, courts can and should
award punitive damages in excess of the compensatory damages. Courts
have also shown a willingness to award punitive damages greater than
compensatory damages in cases where the compensatory damages are not
substantial.
Interestingly, maintenance and cure cases involving punitive damages
present some interesting and thorny issues regarding the application of any
applicable ratio. This is because the maintenance and cure claim may be
cumulated with other claims under the Jones Act or for unseaworthiness
and punitive damages. Critically, punitive damages are not available in
Jones Act cases (other than those involving the arbitrary and capricious
failure to pay maintenance and cure),13 and in 2019, in Dutra Group v.
Batterton,14 the Court held that punitive damages are not recoverable as
part of a seaman’s claim against the vessel owner for unseaworthiness
based upon the applicable statutory scheme.15 Thus, where the claims
12. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 424 n.11 (citation omitted) (citing Exxon, 554 U.S.
at 514–15).
13. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2014), cert
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015).
14. Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. 2275 (2019), rev’g Batterton v. Dutra
Group, 880 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2018), and effectively overruling Tabingo v. Am.
Triumph, LLC, 391 P.3d 434 (Wash. 2017), cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 648 (2018).
A divided en banc Fifth Circuit had previously held that punitive damages were
not available where a seaman was injured or killed, as a result of an unseaworthy
condition of the relevant vessel. McBride, 768 F.3d 382.
15. The Court relied upon the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 30104. While the
U.S. Supreme Court has not considered the issue, and the Fifth Circuit has
reserved the questions, Casaceli v. Martech Int’l, Inc., 774 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir.
1985), lower courts have authorized recovery of punitive damages in actions
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overlap a court must be careful that the compensatory damages
denominator in the punitive damages ratio fraction only includes
compensatory damages arising out of the claim for failure to pay
maintenance and cure, not damages solely awarded for Jones Act
negligence or unseaworthiness. The courts must be careful to assure the
needed precision and accuracy.
The Exxon Court also made clear that it was considering the ratio issue
based on its admiralty jurisdiction and its authority to develop the law of
admiralty in a common-law-type, case-by-case fashion. The Court was not
analyzing the issue as a procedural or substantive due process question.16
But even though Exxon was not a due process case, some courts continue
to confuse the matter; others question whether Exxon may impact the
relevant ratio outside the maritime context;17 and some tend to
inappropriately mix the admiralty and due process analyses.18 Notably,
although due process issues may arise in an admiralty case, courts should
separate the admiralty analysis and the due process analysis. The court
should first consider the ratio question as an admiralty matter (deciding
the applicability or not of the 1:1 rule) and only thereafter consider the due
process issues, if necessary.
In the following section, I will explain why Exxon’s 1:1 ratio is not a
bright-line rule based on a careful reading of Exxon itself, the ensuing
jurisprudence, and the reasons why flexibility is desirable. In Section II, I
will discuss the particular ratio issues raised in maintenance and cure cases
involving punitive damages. In Section III, I will briefly explain the
analytical interaction between a court’s admiralty punitive damages
analysis and the due process punitive damages analysis. Finally, I will set
forth some brief conclusory remarks.

brought by a longshore worker under 33 U.S.C.A. § 905(b). See In re Rodi Marine
LLC, No. 17-5394, 2019 WL 861251 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2019); Callahan v. Gulf
Logistics, L.L.C., No. 06 CV-0561, 2013 WL 5236888 (W.D. La. Sept. 16, 2013);
Rutherford v. Mallard Bay Drilling L.L.C., No. 99-3689, 2000 WL 805230 (June
21, 2000); Summers v. Salmon Bay Barge Line, Inc., No. 12-5859, 2013 WL
5912917, at *11–12 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 4, 2013).
16. For a discussion of a significant portion of the Court’s punitive damages
substantive due process decisions, see Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., U.S. Supreme
Court Tort Reform: Limiting State Power to Articulate and Develop Tort Law—
Defamation, Preemption, and Punitive Damages, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1189, 1243–
56 (2006); see also Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
17. See, e.g., Wright v. Fentress Cnty., No. 17-0070, 2019 WL 1828302
(M.D. Tenn. Mar. 22, 2019).
18. Warren v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 233 So. 3d 568 (La. 2017).
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I. IS THE 1:1 RATIO A BRIGHT-LINE RULE/CAP OR MERELY A GUIDE
APPLICABLE IN CASES LIKE EXXON?
In this section, I will discuss the jurisprudence addressing whether the
Exxon Court’s holding of a 1:1 ratio is an across-the-board cap on recovery
of punitive damages in maritime cases or merely a guideline applicable to
cases like Exxon in which the conduct was reckless (and not worse, i.e.,
malicious), not profit seeking, and where there was a significant
compensatory damage award as well as other fines, penalties, settlements
paid, or additional compensatory-damages awards in other related cases. I
will begin the analysis with Exxon itself.
A. Exxon
Perhaps the best argument that the 1:1 ratio Justice Souter articulated
in Exxon is an across-the-board rule is that his analysis leading up to the
announcement of the ratio was extensive, even exhaustive.19 The language
is broad. Moreover, the concerns which Justice Souter considered
regarding punitive damages—their amount and their variability—are
applicable across the board. And, after all, Exxon is a U.S. Supreme Court
decision. Moreover, Justice Stevens, in partial dissent,20 counselled
discretion and judicial restraint. He noted that legislatures, not courts,
created “precise ratio[s]” of punitive to compensatory damages.21 Justice
Ginsburg also dissented, in part,22 and expressed concerns for judicial lawmaking. Justice Breyer also dissented, in part, because he thought that the
circumstances justified a deviation from the 1:1 rule.23 So one could claim
that the partial dissents indicate that those Justices read the 1:1 ratio as a
“rule.”
But all that said, the Court, in Justice Souter’s opinion, expressly
limited its holding to “cases like this one.” And the Court referred to “cases
like this one” as “such cases.” Again, such cases, grammatically and
logically, are not all cases. Moreover, and critically, in the first paragraph
19. One might question the heavy reliance on social science data and the risks
inherent in having a judge, who is not necessarily an expert in social science and
statistics, make decisions based on such data. Be that as it may, the Court has
famously relied upon social science data in the past. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
20. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 516 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
21. Id. at 520 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
22. Id. at 522 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23. Id. at 525 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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of the opinion, Justice Souter stated that the issue before the Court was
“whether the award . . . in this case is greater than maritime law should
allow in the circumstances.”24 And, he noted the particular factors at play
in Exxon: reckless—not malicious—conduct, no profit motive behind the
wrongful conduct giving rise to the incident, substantial compensatory
damages, and other cleanup costs, fines, and penalties. It bears noting, as
quoted in the next paragraph, that Justice Souter referred to the damages
caused by the oil spill as “staggering.”25 At the end of the day, this
language that limits the breadth of the earlier discussion deserves just as
much emphasis and weight as the earlier, broad language.
In his Exxon opinion, Justice Souter rejected 3:1 punitive to
compensatory damages ratios, among others. In rejecting 3:1 or other
ratios, he articulated the limiting language quoted herein. He wrote:
[O]ne feature of the 3:1 schemes dissuades us from selecting it
here. With a few statutory exceptions, generally for intentional
infliction of physical injury or other harm, the States with 3:1
ratios apply them across the board (as do other States using
different fixed multipliers). That is, the upper limit is not directed
to cases like this one, where the tortious action was worse than
negligent but less than malicious, exposing the tortfeasor to
certain regulatory sanctions and inevitable damages actions; the
3:1 ratio in these States also applies to awards in quite different
cases involving some of the most egregious conduct, including
malicious behavior and dangerous activity carried on for the
purpose of increasing a tortfeasor’s financial gain. We confront,
instead, a case of reckless action, profitless to the tortfeasor,
resulting in substantial recovery for substantial injury. Thus, a
legislative judgment that 3:1 is a reasonable limit overall is not a
judgment that 3:1 is a reasonable limit in this particular type of
case.26
So, if the Court rejected the 3:1 ratio because it applied in all cases,
why would it adopt a 1:1 ratio that applied to all admiralty cases? I contend
that it would not; to do so would be illogical. Moreover, in articulating the

24. Id. at 476 (majority opinion).
25. Id. at 510–11.
26. Id. (citations omitted). He also rejected the 2:1 ratio applicable in some
federal treble damages statutes because, in part, Congress created them to
stimulate enforcement through private actions, an incentive not needed in cases
like Exxon.
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1:1 ratio, Justice Souter, while returning to the social science data he had
earlier discussed, said:
These studies cover cases of the most as well as the least
blameworthy conduct triggering punitive liability, from malice
and avarice, down to recklessness, and even gross negligence in
some jurisdictions. . . . In a well-functioning system, we would
expect that awards at the median [1:1] or lower would roughly
express jurors’ sense of reasonable penalties in cases with no
earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness within the punishable
spectrum (cases like this one, without intentional or malicious
conduct, and without behavior driven primarily by desire for gain,
for example) and cases (again like this one) without the modest
economic harm or odds of detection that have opened the door to
higher awards. . . . On these assumptions, a median ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages of about 0.65:1 probably
marks the line near which cases like this one largely should be
grouped. Accordingly, given the need to protect against the
possibility (and the disruptive cost to the legal system) of awards
that are unpredictable and unnecessary, either for deterrence or for
measured retribution, we consider that a 1:1 ratio, which is above
the median award, is a fair upper limit in such maritime cases.27
Certainly, Justice Souter relies on the social science research, but I
have highlighted the language limiting the application of the 1:1 ratio to
“such cases.” Both in distinguishing 3:1 and other ratios and in articulating
the 1:1 ratio, Justice Souter consistently limited the 1:1 ratio to “cases like
this one.” Words matter, and every word matters in a judicial opinion. The
holding of the case is what matters most, and the holding in Exxon applies
to the facts before the Court. And the reach beyond the holding is expressly
limited to “cases like this one.”
Finally, even though some language in Justice Ginsburg’s partial
dissent could be read as believing Justice Souter had created a rule, she
also wrote:
[A]ssuming a problem in need of solution, the Court’s lawmaking
prompts many questions. The 1:1 ratio is good for this case, the
Court believes, because Exxon’s conduct ranked on the low end
of the blameworthiness scale: Exxon was not seeking “to augment
profit,” nor did it act “with a purpose to injure,” ante, at 2622.
What ratio will the Court set for defendants who acted maliciously
27. Id. at 512–13 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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or in pursuit of financial gain? See ante, at 2631 – 2632. Should
the magnitude of the risk increase the ratio and, if so, by how
much? Horrendous as the spill from the Valdez was, millions of
gallons more might have spilled as a result of Captain
Hazelwood’s attempt to rock the boat off the reef.28
That language clearly indicates that she understood there may be
different applicable ratios in different cases where the defendant’s conduct
was more blameworthy or profit-driven.
A fact- or case-type, limited reading of Exxon is also appropriate
because it is consistent with the nature and purposes of punitive damages.
Punitive damages exist to punish and deter the defendant. Punishment
should be proportional to the level of wrongdoing. Deterrence should be
adequate to induce the defendant and others not to repeat the wrongful
behavior giving rise to the plaintiff’s injuries. There are times when the
heinous nature of the defendant’s behavior dwarfs the compensatory
damages awarded. Alternatively, malicious, or even reckless, behavior
may give rise, luckily for the plaintiff, to small compensatory damages
awards. This may occur in maintenance and cure cases where the personal
injuries are not severe, but the employer willfully and wantonly failed to
pay maintenance and cure. Where compensatory damages are low,
punitive damages are an inducement to bringing suit where it might not
otherwise be worth the investment.29 Now, let me turn to the post-Exxon
jurisprudence and how various courts have considered and applied the 1:1
ratio.
B. The Post-Exxon Jurisprudence
There are several cases in which the ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages was 1:1 or less and, thus, there were no questions concerning
whether the 1:1 ratio is an across-the-board cap or a guideline applicable
to “cases like” Exxon.30 There are some judicial statements that the 1:1
28. Id. at 524 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29. See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Disaggregating More-Than-Whole
Damages in Personal Injury Law: Deterrence and Punishment, 71 TENN. L. REV.
117 (2004).
30. In Barnes v. Sea Hawaii Rafting, LLC, a seaman was injured by an
explosion on a small boat used for commercial snorkeling trips. No. 13-00002,
2018 WL 4854662 (D. Haw. Oct. 5, 2018). The employer did not pay maintenance
and cure, claiming that it had attempted to investigate the claim, but the seaman
did not cooperate. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought punitive damages and
attorney’s fees for the willful failure to pay maintenance and cure. The court held
that the seaman was entitled to punitive damages. Before that decision, the court
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had entered a previous order that the seaman was entitled to maintenance and cure,
even though the amount was not established, yet the employer still failed to pay
it for five years. The court awarded: past maintenance of $140,950.34, cure of
$21,697.76, punitive damages in the amount of $10,000 with attorney’s fees and
costs to be determined after appropriate motions, pre-judgment interest at 10%
per year of $106,758.02, and post-judgement interest on principal amount at
2.74% per year for a total of $279,406.12. In Hicks v. Vane Line Bunkering, Inc.,
the jury found for the defendant on the plaintiff’s maritime negligence claim, but
for the plaintiff on the maintenance and cure claim. No. 11 Civ. 8158, 2013 WL
1747806 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2013). The jury awarded $445,000 total damages, of
which $123,000 was for punitive damages for the willful and wanton termination
of maintenance and cure. The court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial,
regarding punitive damages: “Nor is the amount of those damages excessive.
While the Supreme Court has questioned whether maritime punitive damages may
exceed a 1:1 ratio with the compensatory damages awarded, the $123,000 punitive
damages award here is far less than the $322,000 compensatory damages award.”
Id. at *7 (citation omitted) (citing Exxon, 554 U.S. 471). There was not extensive
discussion of Exxon. In Stermer v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., the trial court
found that the defendant’s failure to pay maintenance and cure for two-and-a-half
years was arbitrary and capricious and warranted a punitive damage award. 140
So. 3d 879 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2014). The trial court awarded approximately
$637,000 in compensatory (lost wages, pain and suffering, etc.), $300,000 in
punitive damages, and $150,000 for attorney’s fees. The ratio was less than 1:1.
The court of appeal affirmed the punitive damages award and remanded for
recalculation of attorney’s fees. On remand, the court awarded the plaintiff
$309,000 in attorney’s fees, which was affirmed, plus another $10,000 in fees for
appeal. Stermer v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 186 So. 3d 319 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 2016). Even with higher fee awards, the ratio was less than a 1:1 ratio, but
barely. The court did not cite Exxon. In Varela v. Dantor Cargo Shipping, Inc.,
the plaintiff-crewmember injured his foot while on board the vessel. No. 1723127-Civ, 2017 WL 7184605 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2017). He did not receive
adequate medical care and developed an infection, which resulted in permanent
disability. He brought six claims against the defendant: (1) Jones Act negligence,
(2) unseaworthiness, (3) failure to provide maintenance and cure, (4) failure to
treat, (5) general negligence, and (6) an in rem action against the vessel. The court
entered a default judgment of $2.8 million for medical expenses, lost wages, and
pain and suffering on counts 1, 2, and 4, plus $29,440 for past maintenance and
$500,000 in punitive damages under count 3 for willful failure to provide
maintenance and cure. The court did not have reason to discuss Exxon in depth. It
did say:
Under the general maritime law, punitive damages are available for the
“willful and wanton disregard of the maintenance and cure obligation.”
Atl. Sounding, 557 U.S. at 424. Reasonable attorney fees may also be
awarded when a shipowner acts “in bad faith, callously, or
unreasonably” in the withholding of maintenance and cure benefits.
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Flores, 47 F.3d at 1127. The Defendants have admitted, through default,
that their failure to provide the Plaintiff with maintenance and cure was,
and continues to be willful, arbitrary, capricious, and in callous disregard
for Plaintiff’s rights as a seaman. (See Complaint; ECF No. 1, ¶ 44.)
Acosta suggests that an amount equal to the total compensatory damages
would be an appropriate punitive damage award. See Exxon Shipping Co.
v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (“a punitive-to-compensatory ratio of
1:1”). However, under the circumstances of this case, the Court believes
that an award of punitive damages in the amount of $500,000.00 is
appropriate.
Id. at *4; see also Hurtado v. Balerno Int’l, 408 F. Supp. 3d 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
In Hurtado, the court awarded $373,836.16 in punitive damages, which was
precisely what the court had awarded for compensatory damages. The court did
not indicate that Exxon was the reason. And the court also allowed the plaintiff to
subsequently seek attorney’s fees. In Graham v. PCL Civ. Constructors, Inc., two
barges owned by the defendant broke free during a storm and struck the plaintiff’s
fishing boat, causing damage. No. 11-CV-00546, 2013 WL 6835247 (S.D. Tex.
Dec. 23, 2013). The case settled, in part, with the remaining issues, including
whether defendant was liable for punitive damages, proceeding to bench trial. The
judge ruled that the defendant’s conduct was reckless and awarded punitive
damages that equaled 65% of compensatory damages “given the standard set forth
in Exxon Shipping v. Baker.” Id. at *1. The court said:
The fact that PCL’s conduct falls on the lower end of the “punitive
damages” culpability spectrum does influence the amount of the award.
PCL did not act with malice nor was its conduct motivated by a decision
to place economic gain over reasonable safety measures. Exxon Shipping
cited these among the factors that should be considered in determining
the amount of a punitive award. . . . Applying the factors articulated in
Exxon Shipping to this case, and balancing PCL’s culpability at the low
end of the spectrum against the relatively low award of compensatory
damages, the Court concludes that a punitive damages award of the
median ratio—65% of compensatory damages—is the appropriate result.
Id. at *13–14. The court also said:
Although holding that recklessness was sufficient for an award of
punitive damages, the Court reasoned that the amount of such an award
should depend in part on where the defendant’s conduct falls along a
spectrum of varying degrees of fault because “cases of the most as well
as the least blameworthy conduct trigge[r] punitive liability, from malice
and avarice, down to recklessness, and even gross negligence.”
Id. at *12 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Exxon, 554 U.S. at
512). And:
While not purporting to announce a new threshold for the award of
punitive damages in maritime case, Exxon Shipping applied a lower
standard than a number of district courts have previously applied in
denying punitive damages in maritime property damages cases. It is also
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ratio is a broad rule, but these statements occur in cases where the punitive
damages awarded are less than the compensatory damages awarded.31
There is one case in which the court seems to have clearly considered the
Exxon 1:1 ratio and held that it precluded an award of punitive damages
greater than compensatory damages. In Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line
Railroad Co. v. M/V MARLIN,32 a ship allided with a railroad bridge. The
precise legal issue was whether the court should allow the plaintiff railroad
a lower threshold than exists under the law of most states, a majority of
which require either a finding of malice or of some conduct more
egregious than gross negligence, such as “outrageous conduct” or
“willful and wanton indifference to the safety of others.”
Id. (citation omitted); see also Knudson v. M/V Am. Spirit, No. 14-14854, 2020
WL 1475705 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 25, 2020) (defendant argued that the court should
limit any evidence, testimony, or argument that would suggest an amount or
calculation of punitive damages that would exceed a 1:1 ratio to any
compensatory damages; the court held the issue was premature until there was a
punitive damages award at which time defendant could renew the motion).
31. Nelton v. Cenac Towing Co., No. 10-373, 2011 WL 289040 (E.D. La.
Jan. 25, 2011). There, the amount of punitive damages was minimal relative to
the compensatory damages awarded by the trial court following a bench trial.
There was no in-depth discussion of the ratio because it was not an issue. The
court did say, citing Baker: “[T]he Supreme Court has suggested that under
general maritime law, the amount of punitive damages should not exceed the
amount of compensatory relief awarded.” Id. at *22 (citation omitted). For a
similar maintenance and cure case with punitives well below 1:1 citing Nelton,
see Jefferson v. Baywater Drilling, LLC, No. 14-1711, 2015 WL 365526 (E.D.
La. Jan. 27, 2015) ($92,881 for maintenance and cure, $10,000 compensatory
damages, and $10,000 punitive damages). See Jefferson v. Baywater Drilling,
LLC, No. 14-1711, 2015 WL 7281612 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 2015), for subsequent
award of $55,654 in attorney’s fees and costs. Citing Nelton, which cited Baker,
the court said: “As a general rule in maritime cases, punitive damages ‘should not
exceed the amount of compensatory relief awarded.’” Id. at *6. There are also
non-maritime cases where the court discusses Exxon and its cap in dicta. See, e.g.,
Duckworth v. United States, 418 F. Appx. 2, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Hayduk v. City
of Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d 429, 484 n.46 (W.D. Pa. 2008); see also Joni
Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages by Numbers: Exxon Shipping Co.
v. Baker, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 259, 259 (2010) (“The U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker is a landmark that establishes an upper
bound ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages of 1:1 for maritime
cases, with potential implications for other types of cases as well.”); Victor E.
Schwartz et al., The Supreme Court’s Common Law Approach to Excessive
Punitive Damage Awards: A Guide for the Development of State Law, 60 S.C. L.
REV. 881, 882 (2009).
32. Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line R.R. Co. v. M/V MARLIN, No.
08cv134, 2009 WL 1974298 (E.D. Va. Apr. 3, 2009).
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to amend its complaint to seek automatic 3:1 punitive damages under a
Virginia statute dealing with the willful destruction of property owned by
a public service corporation. The court denied leave to amend, holding that
the Virginia law’s 3:1 ratio was inconsistent with Exxon. (Interestingly,
the plaintiff did not request punitive damages under general maritime law).
Technically, Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad Co. presented
an issue of whether maritime law preempted the operation of state law—
or, put differently, whether state law could apply in an admiralty case.
Resolution of that issue required an application of the Supreme Court’s
venerable Jensen33 test and its progeny. In Jensen, the issue was whether
the survivors of a longshore worker killed on the navigable waters of the
United States34 could recover a death benefit under the New York
Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice Bradley, held that because there was maritime jurisdiction over the
case, state law could not apply. In so holding, the Court considered when
a state statute could apply in a maritime case (i.e., a case within maritime
jurisdiction) and said: “[N]o such legislation is valid if it contravenes the
essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works material
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, or
interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its
international and interstate relations.”35 The Jensen Court held that
application of state workers’ compensation law would disrupt the
uniformity of national admiralty law, even in the absence of a national
workers’ compensation law applicable to longshore workers. Congress did
not pass the Longshore Workers Compensation Act until 1927.
Thus, in Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad Co., whether the
Virginia treble damages act could apply called for an application of
Jensen. Could the Virginia statute providing 3:1 punitive damages apply
in a maritime case under Jensen? The Norfolk court did not expressly
undertake that analysis, but it did hold that the Virginia statute could not
apply. It said:
Punitive damages are available under the general maritime law in
cases of property damage. Punitive damages are limited to cases
where “a defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ owing to ‘gross
negligence,’ ‘willful, wanton, and reckless indifference for the
rights of others,’ or behavior even more deplorable.” [Citation to
33. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
34. The case was decided 10 years before Congress passed the Longshore and
Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act. 33 U.S.C. § 901–50.
35. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216. The same test also applies to state jurisprudential
rules. See Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins., 348 U.S. 310 (1954).
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Exxon]. In Exxon, the Supreme Court suggested that in many cases
the appropriate ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages would be .65:1 or less. In any event, except for the most
extreme cases, the maximum permissible ratio is likely 1:1.36
The district court continued:
The Virginia statute provides a strict and inflexible ratio of
punitive damages to actual or compensatory damages. The ratio,
3:1, is automatically applied; an automatic punitive remedy in the
form of triple damages is inconsistent with Exxon’s 1:1 ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages, and therefore conflicts with
the general maritime law.37
While the court did not expressly apply Jensen, its presence looms
large. Clearly, the Norfolk court decided that Exxon provided a uniform
maritime rule that would not abide the application of seemingly
inconsistent state law. Presumably then the court believed that Exxon’s 1:1
ratio was a broadly applicable cap.38 However, Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt
Line Railroad Co. essentially stands alone.
Arguably, the most significant decision in which a court awarded
punitive damages that were greater than compensatory damages is
Clausen v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc.39 There, the trial court found the
defendant-employer, Icicle, liable to the plaintiff-seaman for both
negligence and for the failure to pay maintenance and cure. The lower
court awarded Clausen $453,000 in damages for Icicle’s negligence,
$37,420 in compensatory damages for maintenance and cure, $1.3 million
in punitive damages for willful misconduct in failing to pay maintenance
and cure, $387,558 in attorney fees (only for time spent on the
maintenance and cure claim), and $40,547 in costs. The trial court
determined the ratio as follows: “Adding together the unpaid maintenance
and cure and attorney’s fees award, the amount of compensatory damages
36. Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line R.R. Co., 2009 WL 1974298, at *3
(citations omitted).
37. Id. at *4.
38. For a good discussion of Jensen and the supposed conflict between an
admiralty rule and state law, see Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d
623 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding federal maritime law did not preempt Rhode Island
legislation affording expanded state-law remedies for oil pollution damage even
in the face of maritime jurisprudence limiting the recoverability of economic loss
absent personal injury of property damage).
39. Clausen v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 2010 AMC 793 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2010)
(referred to as Clausen I).
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is $465,525. The punitive damages are $1.3 million. The resulting ratio is
1:2.79.”40 The $465,525 number included attorney fees and costs.41
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed and read Exxon
narrowly. The Clausen court decided that Exxon did not provide a
universal 1:1 cap on punitive damages in maritime cases. The Washington
Supreme Court noted that the facts in Exxon established that Exxon’s
“conduct was not at the extreme end of the scale of egregiousness, no
profit motive was expressly involved, and there was already a substantial
recovery for damages.”42 The court distinguished Icicle’s activity and said
it involved lying “at the extreme end of the scale. The jury found that Icicle
acted callously or willfully and wantonly in its failure to pay maintenance
and cure.”43
As the court noted, Icicle’s conduct was ongoing and egregious. It
refused to pay for spinal injections and surgery that its designated doctor
had recommended. Icicle only paid Clausen $20 per day in maintenance
when it knew that he was basically homeless and that he was living in a
broken-down recreational vehicle. Icicle also made false statements in a
federal court complaint that it filed seeking to terminate Clausen’s

40. Id. at 797.
41. Alternative ratios are (1) the ratio of 3.06, if costs are excluded, and (2)
the ratio of 34.74, if costs and attorney’s fees are excluded. The trial court—in
addition to reading Exxon as only applying to “reckless” conduct, as opposed to
establishing a bright-line rule in all maritime cases—also discounted Icicle’s
claim that Exxon limited punitive damages awarded for willful failure to pay
maintenance and cure by relying on footnote 11 in Townsend:
The defendant claims that the Exxon case provided a universal cap of a
1:1 ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages in all
maritime cases. The Court disagrees. In Atlantic Soundings v.
Townsend, 557 U.S at , 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2574, 2009 AMC 1521, 1537
n.11 (2009), the Supreme Court stated that it was not applying a recovery
cap as it did in the Exxon Valdez case. Specifically, the Court stated:
“Nor have petitioners argued that the size of punitive damages awards in
maintenance and cure cases necessitates a recovery cap, which the Court
has elsewhere imposed. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S., 128
S. Ct. 2605, 2008 AMC 1521, [slip op] at 42 (2008) (imposing a
punitive-to-compensatory ratio of 1:1). We do not decide these issues.”
Thus, Atlantic Soundings specifically did not impose a 1:1 limit as
implied by the defendant.
Id. at 794–95 (alteration in original).
42. Clausen v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 272 P.3d 827, 835 (Wash. 2012)
(referred to as Clausen II).
43. Id.
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maintenance and cure benefits. Moreover, the court stated that Icicle’s
conduct was profit-motivated.44
By comparison, the Clausen court understood Exxon’s conduct to be
“reckless conduct,” and said that the Exxon Court “embraced a variable
limit approach based on culpability.”45 The Clausen court also said:
We find nothing in the Exxon case establishing a general rule
limiting the jury’s role in determining appropriate damages. The
Exxon case cannot be read as establishing a broad, general rule
limiting punitive damage awards, primarily because nowhere in
the opinion can such a rule be found. To the contrary, the United
States Supreme Court expressly limits its holding to the facts
presented. In the first paragraph of the opinion, the issue is framed
as “whether the award . . . in this case is greater than maritime law
should allow in the circumstances.” Exxon, 554 U.S. at 476, 128
S. Ct. 2605 (emphasis added). . . . Nothing in the Exxon opinion
can be read as overruling cases allowing higher punitive awards
or limiting the government’s ability to statutorily provide other
limits. Quite the opposite, the Court seems to embrace an
approach of applying a variable limit based on the tortfeasor’s
culpability.46
Thus, to the Clausen court, Exxon created a variable approach based
on the defendant’s culpability, meaning the appropriate punishment
should match the wrongdoing.
There is a very basic reason underlying the Clausen court’s conclusion
that punitive damages in maintenance and cure cases should not be capped
by a 1:1 ratio. In order to recover punitive damages in a maintenance and
cure case, the seaman must show that the employer was arbitrary and
willful in failing to pay maintenance and cure. Arbitrary and willful or
capricious behavior is different from reckless behavior. It is worse. And
Exxon articulated its holding and its 1:1 ratio in a case involving reckless
behavior, not arbitrary or willful action. Thus, any maintenance and cure
case in which the court awards punitive damages has to involve behavior
that is more culpable on the blameworthiness scale47 than Exxon’s
conduct.
44. Id. at 836.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 835.
47. In her dissent in Exxon, Justice Ginsburg said that Exxon’s behavior was
on the “low end of the blameworthiness scale.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554
U.S. 471, 524 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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The Clausen court also noted that punitive damages beyond the 1:1
ratio to compensatory damages were necessary as a “deterrent.”48 The
court said:
A variable punitive damages award creates a disincentive to
employers who would otherwise prefer to hold out on paying
maintenance and cure until a suit is filed, if at all. Because seamen
do not qualify for state or federal worker compensation, their only
recourse from being abandoned when sick or injured on the job is
maintenance and cure.49
This is particularly apt because in some cases, the maintenance and
cure award may be low even though the employer’s conduct is egregious.
For instance, in Clausen, the maintenance and cure awarded, absent other
damages, was $37,420. If the court capped the punitive damages award by
a 1:1 ratio, then the maximum award for punitive damages would have
been $37,420—perhaps inadequate to provide any real deterrence to an
employer dead set on not paying its seamen maintenance and cure.50 Thus,
in a case where the compensatory damage award is low, a potential in a
maintenance and cure case, punitive damages in excess of the
compensatory damages award may be necessary to deter the defendant
from engaging in the same or similar conduct in the future.
Moving to admiralty cases that do not involve the failure to pay
maintenance and cure, in McWilliams v. Exxon Mobil,51 the plaintiff
claimed he developed leukemia as result of exposure to benzene while
working on the defendant’s vessels and brought general maritime law and
Jones Act claims. The jury awarded $5.5 million in compensatory
damages, plus $12 million in punitive damages (original ratio of 2.18 to
48. Clausen II, 272 P.3d at 836.
49. Id.
50. Interestingly, Clausen II classified attorney’s fees as compensatory in
nature, even though they are only available upon a finding of willful and wanton
conduct. Id. at 832 (citing Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530 (1962)). The
Washington Supreme Court accepted the trial court’s calculation:
After including the attorney fees in the compensatory award, the trial
court found the punitive damages award was less than three times the
size of the compensatory award and within due process limits. Because
Icicle does not contend the punitive damages award violates due process,
we need not determine whether the trial court used the correct standard
or applied it properly.
Id. at 836 n.5.
51. McWilliams v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 111 So. 3d 564 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 125 So. 3d 451 (La. 2013).
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1). The case is somewhat unique because the trial court had struck all of
the defendant’s defenses based upon the defendant’s violation of court
orders. Thus, neither the appellate nor trial courts discussed defendants’
actions vis-a-vis the actual injury McWilliams suffered. The court of
appeal upheld the sanctions, reduced the compensatory award slightly, and
upheld the amount of the punitive damage award, resulting in an adjusted
ratio of 2.28 to 1. As to Clausen and Baker, the court said:
We agree with the Washington Supreme Court’s analysis of
Exxon. Therein, the United States Supreme Court did not establish
a general rule pertaining to punitive damages, but rather, narrowly
tailored that result to the unique case before it. Most notably, the
United States Supreme Court must also agree with the Clausen
court’s analysis, as it denied certiorari in that case. The
Defendants’ assertion that any punitive damage award must
adhere to a 1:1 compensatory to punitive damages ratio is devoid
of merit. As the Defendants do not challenge the amount of the
award other than as related to the compensatory damage award,
we can find no error in the jury’s award.52
Thus, there was no detailed analysis of the issue in McWilliams, and
it is unclear to what extent the defendant’s misconduct in the litigation
may have influenced the punitive damages award. Be that as it may, the
decision is a rejection of the contention that Exxon established an acrossthe-board cap on punitive damages for all maritime cases.
In Colombo v. BRP U.S. Inc.,53 a California court of appeal also
rejected an across-the-board 1:1 ratio for punitive to compensatory
damages in maritime cases. Colombo was a maritime products liability
case. The defendant manufacturer had knowledge of the risk posed by its
product and knowledge of similar previous accidents. The trial court found
the defendant liable for failure to provide a warning that riding on the back
of a jet ski without protective clothing could result in serious personal
injuries if the rider fell off the back of the jet ski and into the vessel’s
powerful jet stream. The jury awarded two teenagers, who suffered
horrific orifice injuries when they were thrown off the vessel and into the
jet stream, $3.39 million and $1.06 million in compensatory damages,
respectively. The jury also apportioned fault equally between the jet ski
manufacturer, the rental company, and the employee driving the jet ski on
which the victims were riding as passengers (1/3 each). The jury also held,
under federal maritime law, that the manufacturer’s conduct entailed
52. Id. at 579.
53. Colombo v. BRP US Inc., 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 580 (Ct. App. 2014).
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“reckless or callous disregard for the rights of others” and awarded the
plaintiffs $1.5 million in punitive damages.54
The defendant contended that Exxon mandated that the punitive
damages awarded could not exceed the compensatory damages. The
Colombo court rejected that argument, citing Clausen and McWilliams.55
It read Exxon as establishing a rule for “that” case.56 Exxon did not create
a bright-line rule in maritime cases, capping the punitive damages award
at the amount of compensatory damages recovered.57 Colombo also noted
that the Exxon majority said that a 1:1 ratio might not be appropriate in
cases where the wrongdoing was hard to detect or where the compensatory
damages were small and thus might not provide sufficient incentive to
sue.58
Turning to the particular awards at issue, the Colombo court found that
for one victim, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages
was less than 1:1. But for the second victim the ratio was 3.78 to 1. This
was due, in part, to the California rule governing joint and several liability.
Under the applicable rule, a joint tortfeasor in California is jointly and
severally liable for economic damages but only severally liable for noneconomic damages.59 The jury had awarded the plaintiff at issue $63,494
in economic damages and $1 million in noneconomic damages. Thus, the
manufacturer was liable for $63,494 in economic damages (jointly and
severally) and $333,333 in noneconomic damages (severally) for a total of
$396,827, which was less than the $1.5 million the jury awarded in
punitive damages. The question for the court was whether the latter award
was “excessive as a matter of maritime law.”60 The court held that it was
not. It noted that the Exxon Court had several times stated that Exxon’s
conduct was on the lower end of the blameworthiness scale—reckless but
not malicious. The Colombo court found that the jet ski manufacturer’s
conduct was on the higher end of the blameworthiness scale. The
defendant knew and had known for quite some time that passengers falling
off the back of its jet skies were suffering orifice injuries; knew that with
the operator seated in the operator’s seat, a passenger might not be able to
54. Id. at 590–91.
55. Id. at 604–05.
56. Id. at 607.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West 2020). It is not clear why the court
decided to apply California law on joint and several liability rather than the
maritime rule under which the defendant would have been potentially liable for
100% of the economic and non-economic damages whatever its share of fault.
60. Colombo, 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 607–08.
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see the warning under the console; and knew that the manufacturer
considered but did not place a warning at the back of the ski where the
passenger could have seen. Another manufacturer did exactly that, but the
defendant did not do so because of a concern about a possible dilution
effect.61 Thus, the court concluded that the $1.5 million in punitive
damages awarded to the second victim was “a reasonable and
proportionate measure of the [manufacturer’s] blameworthiness . . . in
failing to adequately warn her of the need to wear the requisite protective
clothing to reduce or minimize the risk of potentially severe orifice injury
from the PWC jet-thrust nozzle.”62
Interestingly, while not expressly discussed, the ratio of punitive
damages to compensatory damages for the second victim in Colombo,
3.78:1, would only have been 1.41:1 had the defendant been liable for the
entire $1,000,000 in non-economic damages that the plaintiff suffered.
While 1.41:1 is still greater than 1:1, it is interesting to note that the
compensatory award for noneconomic damages is less than the amount
that the jury awarded and that the plaintiff suffered. Thus, a defendant not
liable for all the harm that it caused might not be adequately deterred in an
economic sense, when considering what to do and how to do it. This is a
variant on the situation when compensatory damages are insufficient to
incentivize a suit, leading to underdeterrence. One will recall that in
Exxon, the Court uttered its 1:1 ratio in a case where the damage award
was “substantial.”63
Warren v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co.,64 like Colombo, is a maritime
products liability case, involving failure-to-warn claims. In Warren, a
group of young people were engaged in recreational boating on a former
channel of the Calcasieu River in Louisiana. While travelling at a high
speed, the steering in the boat failed and the vessel J-hooked. That is, it
violently turned when the steering failed and went into a spin. Derek
Hebert and four other passengers were ejected from the boat. The kill
switch had not been engaged, so the boat spun around. Its propeller struck
Derek nineteen times, killing him. His parents, who were estranged,
brought wrongful death and survival actions against the vessel’s owner,
the owner’s son—who had been operating the vessel at the time of the
injury—and Teleflex, the manufacturer of the hydraulic steering system.
The plaintiffs alleged that Teleflex was reckless in its failure to place a
warning on the steering system itself that the loss of even a small quantity
61.
62.
63.
64.
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of hydraulic fluid—3.2 teaspoons—could result in a total failure of the
steering system.
The plaintiff-mother settled her claims, and the father’s case
proceeded to trial. The amount of the mother’s settlement was
confidential. The jury found the manufacturer was aware of the risk of
steering failure caused by loss of hydraulic fluid and had unreasonably
failed to warn of the risk on the steering column itself. The jury awarded
$125,000 in compensatory damages—$100,000 in the survival action and
$25,000 in the wrongful death action. It also awarded $23 million in
punitive damages.65 Apparently, the jury concluded that the father and son
did not enjoy a close relationship. The ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages was 184:1.
The defendant appealed on numerous grounds, including the amount
of the punitive damages vis-à-vis the compensatory damages. The
defendant challenged the award on constitutional grounds and admiralty
grounds. The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the lower
court’s decision.66 The Third Circuit concluded that Teleflex’s conduct
justified the imposition of punitive damages, and it then reviewed the
amount of the award to determine if it was excessive. The appellate court
did not find the award excessive. In reference to Exxon, the court said:
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, . . . the Court discussed the upper
limits for punitive damage awards in maritime cases of that type,
acknowledging that the inquiry was very specific to the facts of
that case. The Court articulated that its effort to find such a limit
was relevant only to cases “with no earmarks of exceptional
blameworthiness within the punishable spectrum . . . and
cases . . . without the modest economic harm or odds of detection
that have opened the door to higher awards.” Based upon the facts
in Exxon, where the damage was economic and involved an
accidental running aground by a tanker, the Court ultimately
arrived at a 1:1 ratio but discussed higher awards, distinguishing
itself from cases that involve egregious conduct and dangerous
activity “carried on for the purpose of increasing a tortfeasor’s
financial gain.” By comparison, the Exxon Court said, “We
confront, instead, a case of reckless action, profitless to the
tortfeasor, resulting in substantial recovery for substantial injury.”
...
The Court in Exxon repeatedly narrowed its findings to the facts
65. The wrongful death and survival awards were apparently under Louisiana
law, and the punitive damages were awarded under maritime law.
66. Warren v. Shelter Mut. Ins., 196 So. 3d 776 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2016).
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in that case where the harm was economic loss, the conduct was
unintentional and inadvertent, there was no motive for financial
gain, and the compensatory damages were substantial at
$507,500,000. . . . The Court poignantly noted that Exxon had
already paid millions in clean-up costs, and distinguished Exxon
from cases involving a tortfeasor’s egregious conduct and a
motive for gain.67
As can be seen, the court of appeal did not read Exxon as articulating
a generally applicable rule, but rather a rule applicable in the case before
the Court and other cases that shared its characteristics. The Third Circuit
then stated that in reviewing the punitive award it could consider potential
damages (as the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to have indicated in one of
its early constitutional punitive damages decisions), not just actual
damages.68 It noted that had the plaintiff lived, the potential recovery for
an amputated or severely damaged leg could have exceeded $10,000,000.
It then said that even with a potential $8,000,000 compensatory damages
award, rather than $10,000,000, the ratio of the punitive damages award
to the compensatory damages awarded would be 2.8:1. The Third Circuit
stated that the 2.8:1 ratio was “a number within even Exxon’s generalized
upper limits, and well below the due process requirements discussed by
the Supreme Court in the constitutional analyses” given the
reprehensibility of defendant’s conduct.69
The defendant petitioned the Louisiana Supreme Court to review the
case and the Louisiana Supreme Court granted review on a number of
issues.70 On the punitive damages issue, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in
an opinion by Justice Guidry, concluded that the evidence supported the
jury’s conclusion that the defendant acted “wantonly, recklessly, or in
callous disregard for the safety of its customers”71 and that a punitive
damages award was justified. The court then turned to the question of
whether the punitive damages award was excessive. Teleflex once again
raised both admiralty and constitutional challenges to the award and
further claimed that the Exxon decision rejected the use of potential injury
in determining the applicable denominator for the critical ratio.72

67. Id. at 811, 814.
68. Id. at 816. The U.S. Supreme Court decision is TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
69. Warren, 196 So. 3d at 816.
70. Warren v. Shelter Mut. Ins., 233 So. 3d 568 (La. 2017).
71. Id. at 589.
72. Id. at 590.
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The court analyzed both Exxon and the U.S. Supreme Court’s
constitutional decisions. As for Exxon, the Louisiana Supreme Court said:
We first address the issue of whether Exxon set forth a 1:1 ratio
recovery cap for punitive damages in general maritime cases.
Teleflex argues the lower courts erred in not reducing the jury’s
award of punitive damages in accordance with Exxon, where the
Court reduced a punitive damages award applying a 1:1 ratio to
compensatory damages. Although Exxon may not have set forth a
“recovery cap” per se, we find the Court in Exxon was expressly
attempting to set a “fair upper limit” for punitive damages “in
cases with no earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness within the
punishable spectrum . . ., cases . . . without intentional or
malicious conduct, and without behavior driven primarily for
gain . . ., and cases . . . without the modest economic harm or
odds of detection that have opened the door to higher awards.”73
Thus, like the Third Circuit and the courts in Clausen, McWilliams,
and Colombo, the Louisiana Supreme Court did not read Exxon as
articulating an across-the-board rule regarding punitive damages in all
maritime cases, even though it did somewhat cryptically say: “In effect,
the Court established that, under general maritime law, punishment for
conduct minimally related to the goals of punishment and deterrence could
be quantifiably limited and subject to a 1:1 ratio with compensatory
damages, which in the Exxon case were substantial.”74 The sentence is not
entirely consistent with what the Louisiana Supreme Court said earlier, but
the court does couch its statement in reference to a case where the
compensatory damages were substantial. Whatever the court meant by that
sentence, what it did was consistent with its earlier statement that Exxon
did not create a per se rule applicable to all admiralty cases. And what it
did, while reducing the punitive damages award, was to allow recovery of
punitive damages in an admiralty case that were significantly greater than
the compensatory damages that the jury had awarded.
The court reviewed the evidence of Teleflex’s conduct and reiterated
that its behavior was “wanton, reckless, or in callous disregard for the
safety of others.”75 But it did not find the conduct “at the extreme end of
the reprehensibility spectrum,”76 as the Third Circuit had concluded. The
court then turned to an analysis of the facts from a constitutional
73.
74.
75.
76.
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perspective. Ultimately, the Louisiana Supreme Court amended the
punitive award, reducing it to $4.25 million, for a ratio of 34:1, if one
calculates the ratio using the actual compensatory damages awarded. But
the Louisiana Supreme Court seemed to approve of the court of appeal’s
determination that the compensatory damage awards were unusually low
(perhaps justifying deviation from 1:1). The court discussed the “potential
harm” in light of Exxon versus the “actual harm.” The court noted that the
mother had settled her claim prior to trial. Notably, in applying the 1:1
ratio in Exxon, Justice Souter considered not just the compensatory
damages awarded but also the amount of settlements Exxon had paid, in
determining the compensatory damages—the denominator of the ratio
fraction. In calculating its ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, the
Warren court said:
However, the majority in Exxon did not expressly address whether
potential harm remains a valid consideration in general maritime
cases with regard to the 1:1 ratio set in that case, and we decline
to try to anticipate how that Court might rule. But actual harm is
certainly a relevant consideration, as the history of the Exxon case
reveals. In that case, the district court, as explained above,
considered settlements paid to the plaintiffs during the litigation
as relevant compensatory damages under the ratio analysis. In the
instant case, the compensatory damages awarded to the father
were understandably low, and there is no suggestion the jury
abused its discretion with regard to those awards. The mother of
Derek settled her claims prior to trial, thus the compensatory
damages she received could logically be added to the denominator
in the ratio analysis as included in the actual harm caused by the
defendant’s conduct. In Hutto v. McNeil–PPC, Inc., 2011–609
(La. App. 3 Cir. 12/7/11), 79 So.3d 1199, writ denied, 86 So.3d
628 (La. 4/27/12), the court of appeal recently affirmed general
damages in the amount of $2,000,000 to each parent for the death
of their child in a products liability case. Thus, using that amount,
relevant compensatory damages in this case could reasonably total
$2,125,000, which when compared to the punitive damages
awarded by the jury, would result in a ratio of 10.8:1, beyond the
single digit limits of constitutional due process as well as the upper
limits in Exxon.77

77. Id. at 597–98.
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The court concluded that while Teleflex’s conduct was reprehensible
and caused great harm to Derek and his family, Teleflex did not act
maliciously, and its behavior was not primarily profit-seeking. The
Warren court then again noted that the compensatory damages actually
awarded were low, but the harm caused was great—the loss of a child.
“[T]hus the door was opened to higher awards.”78
Concluding, the court held that $23 million violated both due process
and maritime law. The court then used the “actual harm” wrongful death
damages cited above to calculate a new punitive award:
In this case, the harm caused was great—physical injury resulting
in the violent death of a young man—while the defendant’s
conduct was not the most egregious on the spectrum of punishable
cases, and the compensatory damages actually awarded were
relatively small. In our view, based on the actual harm, and the
relevant compensatory damages as outlined in the Exxon line of
cases, we find that a punitive damage award of $4,250,000, with
a ratio of 2:1 to relevant compensatory damages of $2,125,000,
more appropriately furthers the goal of punitive damages, that is,
to punish and to deter future conduct, while protecting the
defendant’s right to due process. Accordingly, we amend the
jury’s award of punitive damages to $4,250,000, and affirm as
amended.79
At the end of the day, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Warren
authorized recovery of punitive damages greater than 1:1, based, in part,
on the fact that the compensatory damages awarded were low. While the
court ultimately stated that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
was 2:1, that statement must be read in light of the court’s use of
comparable wrongful death awards in similar cases, rather than the actual
compensatory damages awarded, due, in part, to the confidentiality of the
mother’s settlement amount.
C. Lessons from the Jurisprudence
To recap, virtually all of the courts that have meaningfully discussed
the impact of Exxon’s statement concerning the 1:1 ratio of punitive to
78. Id. at 598.
79. Id. at 599; see generally Josie N. Serigne, Comment, Don’t Rock the
Boat: Developing a Uniform System of Maritime Punitive Damages After Baker
and Townsend, 79 LA. L. REV. 327 (2018).
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compensatory damages have refused to treat it as a per se rule applicable
in all admiralty cases. Rather than emphasizing the broad scope of Justice
Souter’s review of the relevant social science data on punitive damages,
the lower courts have emphasized the limiting language in Justice Souter’s
opinion. That is, the lower courts have treated the 1:1 ratio as the precise
holding of the Exxon case, a holding applicable to the facts before the
Court. At most, the courts have treated Exxon as a rule for cases “like”
Exxon. Those are cases where the defendant’s conduct constituted
recklessness or gross negligence and not worse, such as willful, wanton,
malicious, arbitrary, capricious, or intentional wrongdoing. Additionally,
Exxon was a case in which the damage was not difficult to detect—it was
substantial and overt. It was also a case where the compensatory damages,
fines and penalties, cleanup costs, and settlements of claims were
substantial, even gargantuan. Moreover, Exxon was a case in which the
defendant’s behavior—not taking action to relieve a known, relapsed
alcoholic of command of an oil tanker—was not motivated by profit.
All of the cases discussed above that refused to create a per se 1:1 cap
on punitive damages in maritime cases have read Exxon as limited to its
holding or to cases “like” the one before the Court, based on the language
the Court used. Most of the lower courts have also distinguished Exxon
from the facts before them.80 For instance, in Clausen, the Washington
Supreme Court distinguished Exxon because the conduct at issue in the
case before it, namely, willful and wanton failure to pay maintenance and
cure, was much worse than reckless. It was “nearer the ‘most egregious’
end of the culpability scale.”81 Additionally, the Washington Supreme
Court noted that the defendant’s conduct was motivated by profit and that
punitive damages were needed to deter the defendant from treating other
seamen as it had treated the plaintiff. Interestingly, while there is some
recent inconsistent language in Dutra Group v. Batterton,82 courts
generally give special solace to seaman, treating them as the wards of the
court.83 Of course, all of the punitive damages cases involving the arbitrary
and capricious failure to pay maintenance and cure, by definition, involve
seaman. Exxon did not.
80. Cf. McWilliams v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 111 So. 3d 564 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 2013). McWilliams quotes Clausen extensively and then adopts its holding
without distinguishing Exxon in its discussion of punitive damages. Id. But
McWilliams might be explained in reference to the fact that the court had struck
all of the defendant’s defenses, so it was in a rather unique procedural posture. Id.
at 568.
81. Clausen II, 272 P.3d 827, 836 (Wash. 2012).
82. Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. 2275 (2019).
83. See, e.g., Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
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The Colombo court also distinguished Exxon, finding that the jet ski
manufacturer’s conduct was on the higher end of the blameworthiness
scale. Moreover, the application of the California several liability rule
regarding non-economic losses meant that the total liability of the jet ski
manufacturer was less than the total damages caused. Thus, the California
non-economic damages rule mitigated the substantiality of the
compensatory damage award—a fact distinguishing Colombo from Exxon,
where all the known, recoverable damage was substantial.
Warren is a case where even though the Louisiana Supreme Court did
not find that the defendant’s conduct was on the highly blameworthy end
of the scale, the compensatory damages were insignificant—$100,000 on
the survival action and $25,000 on the father’s wrongful death action—
compared to the injury caused—the death of a young man. Even then, in
reducing the jury’s $23,000,000 punitive damages award to $4,250,000,
the court resorted to an examination of compensatory damages in the
parents’ wrongful death actions to justify its conclusion that the ratio of
punitive damages to compensatory damages was 2:1. The ratio was much
higher if one focused on the actual compensatory damages that the jury
awarded the father.
Thus, the courts have wisely applied a “a variable limit,”84 to quote
Clausen, based on the defendant’s culpability,85 the difficulty of detecting
the damage caused, the substantiality of the compensatory damages
awarded, and whether the defendant was motivated by profit. This multifactor analysis is necessary to provide fair and proper punishment86 as well
as efficient deterrence.87 The variable limit also is more consistent with the
language Justice Souter used in Exxon than an across-the-board, per se 1:1
ratio cap on punitive damages in all maritime cases. In the next section, I
will turn to a particular issue that may arise in applying a ratio test to a
punitive damages award in maintenance and cure cases.

84. Clausen II, 272 P.3d at 835.
85. This is of course akin to, if not synonymous with, the courts’
consideration of the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, which the courts
consider in a substantive due process challenge to a punitive damages award.
86. Culpability and punishment should be morally proportionate.
87. Culpability is relevant to deterrence, but the fact that difficult-to-detect
injuries may lead to underenforcement of the relevant right or that small
compensatory damages may inadequately deter is particularly relevant to
deterrence.

350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd 32

2/5/21 12:55 PM

2021]

MORE THINGS TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ADMIRALTY

423

II. PARTICULAR RATIO ISSUES IN MAINTENANCE AND CURE CASES
One unique aspect of maritime law, which is of ancient origin, is the
seaman’s right to recover maintenance and cure when injured in the
service of the ship.88 The right to recover maintenance and cure arises out
of the relationship between the seaman and the shipowner, often the
employer. It is a no-fault remedy.89 Maintenance is the right to a per diem
living allowance for food and lodging, akin to what the seaman would have
received if working and living on board the ship.90 Once the seaman proves
entitlement to maintenance, then the rate is often set by custom in the port91
or potentially by a collective bargaining agreement.92 Cure is the right to
receive medical treatment or the cost thereof until the seaman reaches
maximum medical cure.93
While the right to recover maintenance and cure does not depend upon
shipowner or employer fault, the defendant’s fault in failing to pay
maintenance and cure may give rise to additional liability. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set forth the liability framework in Morales
v. Garijak.94 In the first instance, when a seaman makes a claim for
maintenance and cure, a shipowner is entitled to make a reasonable
investigation before commencing payments.95 If the shipowner reasonably
but incorrectly decides that it does not owe maintenance and cure, then the
defendant is liable for the maintenance and cure owed. Contrariwise, if the
shipowner’s conclusion that it does not owe maintenance and cure is
unreasonable, then the shipowner is liable not only for the unpaid
maintenance and cure but also any ensuing damages.96 “These are the
damages that have resulted from the failure to pay, such as the aggravation
of the seaman’s condition, determined by the usual principles applied in
tort cases to measure compensatory damages.”97 Interestingly, employer
negligence in conducting the investigation concerning the seaman’s
entitlement to maintenance and cure would not only create general

88. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 523 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
89. See, e.g., Bertram v. Freeport McMoran, Inc., 35 F.3d 1008 (5th Cir. 1994).
90. Id. at 1011–12.
91. Hall v. Noble Drilling (U.S.) Inc., 242 F.3d 582 (5th Cir. 2001).
92. See, e.g., Castro v. M/V Ambassador, 657 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. La. 1987).
93. Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1 (1975).
94. Morales v. Garijak, 829 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1987).
95. Id. at 1358.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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maritime law liability but also Jones Act98 liability, i.e., the seaman is
entitled to recover in negligence against its employer under the Jones
Act.99 If the shipowner’s conduct is worse than negligent, it may be liable
for greater damages. If the employer is callous or capricious in its failure
to pay maintenance and cure, it may be liable for attorney’s fees and
punitive damages.100 The Morales court recapped its scheme as follows:
Thus, there is an escalating scale of liability: a shipowner who is
in fact liable for maintenance and cure, but who has been
reasonable in denying liability, may be held liable only for the
amount of maintenance and cure. If the shipowner has refused to
pay without a reasonable defense, he becomes liable in addition
for compensatory damages. If the owner not only lacks a
reasonable defense but has exhibited callousness and indifference
to the seaman’s plight, he becomes liable for punitive damages
and attorney’s fees as well.101
The right to recover attorney’s fees based on the shipowner’s arbitrary
and capricious failure to pay maintenance and cure arises, in part, out of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s somewhat opaque opinion in Vaughan v.
Atkinson.102 In Vaughan, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas,
relied upon equity as well as the fact that courts in admiralty had awarded
counsel fees in some cases to justify the award of attorney’s fees to a
seaman whose employer had callously failed to pay maintenance and cure.
In a dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Harlan, would not have
allowed counsel fees per se but would have allowed punitive damages if
the shipowner’s conduct was a “wanton and intentional disregard of the
legal rights of the seaman,” in which case there could be “indirect
compensation” for counsel fees.103But technically, anything the dissenters
said about punitive damages was gratuitous because the plaintiff had not
sought punitive damages. Despite the decision’s opacity, it is now
accepted that the arbitrary and capricious failure to pay maintenance and

98. 46 U.S.C. § 30104.
99. Id.
100. Morales, 829 F.2d at 1358.
101. Id.
102. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962). In Hicks v. Tug PATRIOT,
the court referred to Vaughan as cryptic. 783 F.3d 939, 943 (2d Cir. 2015).
103. Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 539–40 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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cure will give rise to potential shipowner liability for both attorney’s
fees104 and punitive damages.105
Frequently, injured seamen will join their claims for maintenance and
cure with a Jones Act negligence claim and an unseaworthiness claim.
Thus, a seaman’s recovery can include maintenance, cure, compensatory
damages brought about by the failure to pay maintenance and cure,
attorney’s fees and punitive damages if the employer was arbitrary and
capricious in failing to pay maintenance and cure, compensatory damages
caused by the employer’s negligence under the Jones Act, and
compensatory damages for the unseaworthiness of the vessel. Critically,
the compensatory damages for the failure to pay maintenance and cure,
the Jones Act violation, and the unseaworthy condition of the vessel may
and probably will overlap. Naturally, the seaman can only recover once.
Additionally, and importantly, the seaman may not recover attorney’s fees
or punitive damages on the Jones Act (other than that part of a Jones Act
claim that arises from the negligent failure to pay maintenance and cure
resulting in additional injuries) or unseaworthiness claims.106 These
realities present particular issues in applying any ratio test to a punitive
damages award in a maintenance and cure case. I will discuss these
niceties below.
Starting simply, assume a seaman, Popeye, is injured in the service of
the ship, and Popeye’s employer, Oyl, arbitrarily refuses to pay him
maintenance and cure. The court determines that Popeye was entitled to
$10,000 in maintenance and cure. Assume that for some reason, Popeye’s
attorney did not seek attorney’s fees. If Exxon created a bright line rule
that punitive damages could not exceed compensatory damages, then the
maximum punitive damages that the court could award is $10,000.107
104. Stermer v. Archer-Daniels Midland Co., 140 So. 3d 879 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 2014).
105. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009); see also Hicks, 783
F.3d at 943; Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187, 1190 (11th Cir. 1987);
Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048, 1051–52 (1st Cir. 1973).
106. Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. 2275 (2019).
107. Indeed, in several cases the punitive award did not exceed the
compensatory damages, so ratio application was not a problem. See, e.g., Barnes
v. Sea Haw. Rafting, LLC, No. 13-00002, 2018 WL 4854662 (D. Haw. Oct. 5,
2018) ($140,950.34 for past maintenance, $21,697.76 for cure, and $10,000 in
punitive damages); Hicks v. Vane Line Bunkering, Inc., No. 11CV8158, 2013
WL 1747806 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2013) ($322,000 in compensatory damages and
$123,000 in punitive damages); Jefferson v. Baywater Drilling, LLC, No. 141711, 2015 WL 365526 (E.D. La. Jan. 27, 2015) ($92,881 for maintenance and
cure, $10,000 in compensatory damages, and $10,000 in punitive damages);
Stermer v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 140 So. 3d 879 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
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But, if alternatively, as argued above, Exxon instead created a variable
limit depending upon multiple factors, and the court decided that Oyl’s
conduct was particularly egregious, then it could award over $10,000.
Likewise, if Popeye had miraculous powers of recovery (aided no doubt
by the consumption of spinach) and was back to work much faster than a
normal seaman, then the $10,000 maintenance and cure award may seem
rather low in reference to the amount needed for punishment and
deterrence. That factor also might militate in favor of an award of punitive
damages that exceeds $10,000.
Next, let us assume that Popeye’s attorney does seek both punitive
damages and attorney’s fees and that the court awards $10,000 in damages
for failure to pay maintenance and cure, $10,000 in attorney’s fees, and
$20,000 in punitive damages. What is the ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages? There are three possible answers: (1) 2:1 if we
compare the punitive damages award ($20,000) to the damages for failure
to pay maintenance and cure ($10,000); (2) 1:1 if we consider the
attorney’s fees as part of the compensatory damages and add them to the
failure to pay maintenance and cure ($10,000 + $10,000 = $20,000); (3)
or 3:1 if we treat the attorney’s fees as punitive damages and add the
attorney’s fees to the punitive damages ($10,000 + $20,000 = $30,000).
First, we can safely eliminate the 3:1 possibility. Even though
Vaughan and the Vaughan dissent fostered some confusion on the issue,108
the courts in both Hicks v. Tug PATRIOT109 and Clausen110 considered the
question post-Exxon and concluded that an award of attorney’s fees in a
failure to pay maintenance and cure case is compensatory in nature, not
punitive. In Hicks, the court concluded that “Atkinson’s holding that an
award for attorney’s fees may be made where the refusal to pay
maintenance and cure was ‘callous,’ ‘willful,’ and ‘persistent’ is not
inconsistent with a punitive award.”111
In Clausen, the court reviewed Vaughan and concluded:
Thus, while the fees are tied to a certain level of culpability
[arbitrary and capricious conduct], the focus is on compensating
the seaman for necessary expenses incurred in litigation, rather
than on punishing and deterring the employer. Although feeshifting in this context may have a punitive feel, it serves to
2014) ($637,000 in compensatory (lost wages, pain and suffering, etc.), $300,000
in punitive damages).
108. See, e.g., Hicks v. Tug PATRIOT, 783 F.3d 939, 943–45 (2d Cir. 2015).
109. Id.
110. Clausen II, 272 P.3d 827 (Wash. 2012).
111. Hicks, 783 F.3d at 945.
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compensate the seaman for being forced to bring an action to
recover what he was clearly entitled to all along.112
Thus, according to both Hicks and Clausen, an award of attorney’s
fees in a maintenance and cure case is a compensatory award. That
conclusion would indicate that the appropriate ratio in the Popeye and Oyl
hypothetical would be 1:1 because adding the maintenance and cure
damages ($10,000) to the award of attorney’s fees ($10,000) yields a total
compensatory damages award of $20,000, which is equal to the punitive
damages awarded. This is indeed what occurred in Clausen.113 Of course,
even if the ratio was greater than 1:1, that still might be acceptable under
the variable-limit approach adopted by the cases discussed in the previous
section and endorsed herein.
Now, let us enhance the details of the hypothetical. Suppose Popeye
recovers $10,000 in unpaid maintenance and cure, $10,000 in
compensatory damages arising out of the failure to pay maintenance and
cure, $10,000 in attorney’s fees, and $30,000 in punitive damages. Once
again, the applicable ratio would seem to be 1:1. Maintenance and cure
($10,000) plus compensatory damages ($10,000) plus attorneys’ fees
($10,000) equals $30,000, which is the same amount as the punitive
damages awarded. The new addition here is the compensatory damages
arising out of the failure to pay maintenance and cure. As noted above,
such damages, including medical expenses and non-economic damages,
are recoverable if the ship owner unreasonably fails to pay maintenance
and cure.114
But what if the seaman joined the maintenance and cure claim with a
Jones Act or unseaworthiness claim? In that case, there may be damages
that the seaman suffered as a result of the initial negligence or
unseaworthiness and then additional damages suffered as a result of the
failure to pay maintenance and cure. Should the court, when considering
112. Clausen II, 272 P.3d at 832.
113. What gets included as compensatory damages makes a real difference in
the ratio. For instance, in Clausen, the relevant ratio was 3.06:1 if costs are
excluded, and 34.74:1 if costs and attorney’s fees are excluded. Interestingly, in a
case tried to the jury, the jury would assess the maintenance and cure damages,
any compensatory damages, and punitive damages. The court would assess the
attorney’s fees. This was not problematic for the Clausen court. Id. at 836. Given
the situation, the court should probably not instruct the jury on the ratio because,
without knowing the attorney’s fees awarded, the jury would not know the total
amount of compensatory damages awarded, and any instruction concerning the
ratio would be hopelessly confusing and incomplete.
114. Hicks, 783 F.3d at 941; Stermer v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 140 So.
3d 879, 885–86 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2014).
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the propriety of any punitive damages award, and determining the
appropriate denominator for the punitive to compensatory damages ratio
or fraction, include all of the compensatory damages? This is apparently
what some courts have done.115 The problem with this approach is that
punitive damages are not available on the Jones Act (other than a claim
arising from failure to pay maintenance and cure) and unseaworthiness
claims, only on the claim for the arbitrary and capricious failure to pay
maintenance and cure. Thus, the factfinder in determining the proper
amount of punitive damages needed to punish and deter the defendant who
has arbitrarily and capriciously failed to pay maintenance and cure must
consider only the wrong for which punitive damages may be imposed, not
some other, additional wrongs. For instance, if the court awarded Popeye
$40,000 for injuries caused by the initial accident that did not arise out of
the failure to pay maintenance and cure, that $40,000 should not be part of
the compensatory damages denominator for purposes of determining the
applicable ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages.
Thus, lawyers representing both seamen and shipowners, and
employers, would be wise in a case with multiple claims—failure to pay
maintenance and cure, Jones Act negligence, and unseaworthiness—to ask
for the allocation of damages based on the relevant claims. In a trial to the
bench, the parties would ask the court to make separate awards for each
claim. In a trial to a jury, the parties would ask the judge to put separate
damages lines for each claim. For instance, the court should be clear in
determining the amounts for maintenance and cure. The court should also
distinguish between Jones Act negligence damages or unseaworthiness
damages and the maintenance and cure award. One tricky issue here is that
Jones Act or unseaworthiness damages for medical expenses may include
palliative treatment, which is not encompassed by cure. Those palliative
care damages should not be part of the analysis of the punitive damages
ratio on any punitive damages claim. Moreover, compensatory damages
on the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims may extend beyond
maintenance that would cease at maximum medical cure. For instance, the
Jones Act and unseaworthiness damages may include future lost earning
capacity. The court should not consider those damages in any analysis of
the punitive damages ratio. Moreover, any damages for pain and suffering,
mental anguish, or loss of enjoyment of life should not be part of the ratio
analysis with one exception. But, any of the Jones Act damages that
115. Varela v. Dantor Cargo Shipping, Inc., No. 17-23127, 2017 WL 7184605
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2017); McWilliams v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 111 So. 3d 564
(La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2013).
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coincide with any compensatory damages to which the seaman is entitled
because of the unreasonable failure to pay maintenance and cure may be
part of the analysis of the punitive damages ratio. Those Jones Act
negligence claims overlap with the general maritime law right to recover
damages occasioned by the failure to pay maintenance and cure. The
simple point arising out of this potentially complex legal situation is that
the court should try as much as is reasonably possible to clearly segregate
and separate the categories of damages and their various causes. This
separation should both avoid double compensation as well as ensure the
denominator of the fraction of punitive and compensatory damages is as
accurate as possible.
The allocation is logical and consistent with common sense lawyering.
From the plaintiff’s perspective, the allocation is a way to protect any
punitive award from attack on appeal. One could imagine a defense
counsel arguing on appeal that the punitive award was excessive because
the jury or judge imposed punitive damages based on all of the claims, and
punitive damages are not available for Jones Act (other than failure to pay
maintenance and cure) and unseaworthiness claims. The downside for the
plaintiff is a need for precision in argumentation and establishing causal
relationships that may be difficult.
From the defense perspective, allocation of damages is protection
against a jury or judge effectively awarding punitive damages based on all
of the various claims and all of the damages, and a reviewing court merely
giving deference to the factfinder’s vast discretion in awarding damages.
One downside for defendants is that allocation puts more damage lines on
a verdict form, and a jury, perhaps more than a judge, may feel inclined to
fill them all.
In sum, punitive damage awards in cases involving willful and wanton
failure to pay maintenance and cure raise some unique concerns regarding
the application of a ratio test. The issues are particularly prominent in cases
where the seaman joins the claim for failure to pay maintenance and
cure—on which punitive damages may be recovered—with Jones Act and
unseaworthiness claims—on which punitive damages generally may not
be recovered. Clear allocation of particular damages to particular claims
seems to be the best solution. In the next section, I turn briefly to the
interplay of any admiralty ratio test with other constitutional attacks on
punitive damages.
III. ADMIRALTY PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND THE CONSTITUTION
The discussion above dealt with the proper amount of punitive
damages in maritime cases and what, if any, binding effect Exxon’s 1:1
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ratio had beyond its precise holding. But, as noted, the U.S. Supreme Court
has decided that there are procedural due process requirements in punitive
damages cases.116 Moreover, the Court has held that there is a substantive
due process limit to the size of a punitive damages award.117 The Court has
articulated three factors for consideration on review: (1) the defendant’s
reprehensibility, (2) the ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages, and (3) a comparison between the punitive award and existing
criminal and civil penalties for similar misconduct.118 The Court has
defined factors for consideration concerning reprehensibility,119 indicated
that ratios of 10:1 or greater would be constitutionally suspect,120 and held
that a court may not award punitive damages to punish a defendant for
injuries inflicted on non-parties to the litigation.121
So how do the due process limits on the recovery of punitive damages
apply in a maritime case, particularly the substantive due process cases
limiting the amount of an award for punitive damages? Cases involving
maritime punitive damages are punitive damages cases, so clearly the
jurisprudence on punitive damages due process applies. But, it would
make the most sense for a court in reviewing a punitive damages award in
a maritime case to first review the award under the maritime jurisprudence
discussed above. Only after the admiralty punitive damages review should
a court conduct the due process review. This is because the initial review
under maritime law may result in a reduction which would obviate or
minimize any due process concerns. As Justice Souter wrote in Exxon:
Today’s enquiry differs from due process review because the case
arises under federal maritime jurisdiction, and we are reviewing a
jury award for conformity with maritime law, rather than the outer
limit allowed by due process; we are examining the verdict in the
exercise of federal maritime common law authority, which
precedes and should obviate any application of the constitutional
standard.122
116. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Corp., 532 U.S. 424 (2001)
(mandating de novo review because an award of punitive damages was not a
finding of fact); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (holding failure
to provide meaningful post-trial or appellate review of the amount of punitive
damages violated the defendant’s right to procedural due process).
117. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
118. Id.
119. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
120. Id.
121. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
122. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501–02 (2008).
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Thus, Exxon counsels separation of the admiralty review of punitive
damages from the due process, constitutional review. All courts have not
done so.123 Merging the analyses will lead to confusion and inconsistency.
On the maritime side, it may lead to arguments that awards of up to 10:1
are not suspect—a spurious claim, at least in cases “like” Exxon. On the
due process side, it might lead to arguments that the 1:1 ratio has a
constitutional due process dimension that it clearly does not.124 There is no
reason to create needless confusion.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court in Exxon limited the amount of recoverable
punitive damages to the amount of compensatory damages awarded, plus
settlements. In so holding it articulated a 1:1 ratio for maritime cases “like”
Exxon, a case which involved the following: reckless conduct but not
worse; damages that were not difficult to detect; a substantial damages
award coupled with significant cleanup costs as well as criminal and other
penalties; and, finally, the absence of a profit motive behind Exxon’s
wrongdoing. In the years since the Court decided Exxon, the most
convincing lower court decisions considering the question have limited
Exxon to its facts or to cases manifesting the characteristics outlined
above.
The courts have read Exxon as creating a variable limit on the size of
awards of maritime punitive damages. There are decisions authorizing
punitive awards in excess of the compensatory damages awarded where
the defendant’s conduct is worse than reckless—willful, wanton,
malicious, arbitrary, or capricious. In addition, courts have considered the
profit motive and, perhaps more implicitly than explicitly, the size or
adequacy of the compensatory damages award. In doing so, the courts
have awarded or affirmed punitive damages in excess of compensatory
damages in a number of cases.
The variable limit on punitive damages in maritime cases is
appropriate given the range of misconduct that may give rise to the claim
and the circumstances of individual cases. For instance, in the maintenance
and cure cases, there is no liability for punitive damages unless the
defendant shipowner has arbitrarily and capriciously failed to pay
123. See Warren v. Shelter Mut. Ins., 233 So. 3d 568 (La. 2017).
124. See, e.g., Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 31 (“The U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker is a landmark that establishes an upper
bound ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages of 1:1 for maritime
cases, with potential implications for other types of cases as well.”); Schwartz et
al., supra note 31.
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maintenance and cure. By definition, arbitrary and capricious misconduct
is worse than reckless, so the maintenance and cure cases are
distinguishable from Exxon.
Moreover, punitive damages greater than compensatory damages may
be necessary to punish and deter recalcitrant employers where maintenance
and cure awards are not large. Additionally, where compensatory damage
awards are low because of the peculiar circumstances of a case, such as the
California several liability rule in Colombo or the quality of the father-son
relationship in Warren, factfinders must have some flexibility to impose fair
but adequate punishment and provide efficient deterrence.
As a word of warning, the application of any ratio in maintenance and
cure cases can be tricky, especially where the claim for failure to pay
maintenance and cure overlaps with other claims, such as Jones Act claims
and unseaworthiness claims, for which punitive damages may not be
recoverable. Thus, courts should make sure to allocate damages in such
claims to the various theories of recovery so as to avoid confusion and
careless analysis. Finally, the courts should consider questions concerning
admiralty punitive damages before any substantive due process review.
This too will avoid confusion.
In closing, let me return to Hamlet to note that there is indeed much
more to the question of the ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages in admiralty cases than 1:1. And, looking forward, if one can
paraphrase one of Horatio’s final lines, because as borrowed, it expresses
a universal judicial truth: Of this I am sure the courts shall have more to
speak.125

125. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at act 5, sc. 2, l. 434. The actual quote is,
“Of that I shall have also cause to speak.”
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